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ABSTRACT
We propose a practical framework to address the problem of
privacy-aware image sharing in large-scale setups. We ar-
gue that, while compactness is always desired at scale, this
need is more severe when trying to furthermore protect the
privacy-sensitive content. We therefore encode images, such
that, from one hand, representations are stored in the pub-
lic domain without paying the huge cost of privacy protec-
tion, but ambiguated and hence leaking no discernible content
from the images, unless a combinatorially-expensive guessing
mechanism is available for the attacker. From the other hand,
authorized users are provided with very compact keys that
can easily be kept secure. This can be used to disambiguate
and reconstruct faithfully the corresponding access-granted
images. We achieve this with a convolutional autoencoder
of our design, where feature maps are passed independently
through sparsifying transformations, providing multiple com-
pact codes, each responsible for reconstructing different at-
tributes of the image. The framework is tested on a large-scale
database of images with public implementation available.
Index Terms— privacy-preserving image sharing, con-
volutional autoencoders, sparse representation, learned com-
pression, image obfuscation.
1. INTRODUCTION
In the era of big data, with recent advances in data driven
machine learning frameworks coupled with growing concern
about the privacy of individuals’ identities when shared with
third parties, it is desirable to release useful representation
of data while simultaneously satisfying some privacy con-
straints. We consider scenarios where the data owner collects
massive amounts of data to provide some utility for the autho-
rized users (clients). For instance, governments, social media
or fin-tech databases posses facial images of citizens or cus-
tomers that should be efficiently communicated with several
of their trusted partners, while strictly having to protect the
privacy of the individuals. The engineering goal in such cases
is to design a practical multi-party data-sharing mechanism
with constraints on data utility and data privacy.
‡ Work done while at Harvard University. B. Razeghi has been supported
by the ERA-Net project ID IoT No 20CH21 167534.
Implementation codes available at: https://github.com/sssohrab/
sparsifying_groups_imAmbiguation
There is a rich literature of prior work on privacy-assuring
mechanisms based, e.g., on cryptographic methods [1], dif-
ferential private based techniques [2], generative adversarial
models [3, 4] or embedding based schemes [5], just to name
a few. The classical privacy-preserving image release mecha-
nisms were mostly based on obfuscation techniques, such as
pixelization and bluring [6,7], or partial encryption such as P3
[8], which are defeated using machine learning methods [9].
The framework of Sparse Coding with Ambiguation (SCA)
[10, 11] shares a compressed, but ambiguated representation
of data within the public domain, while the users can benefit
some utility given an authorized query. This work is closely
related to the SCA, however, rather than information-theoretic
arguments, our focus here is mostly computational: Firstly,
we formulate the requirements of a privacy-aware data-driven
image sharing mechanism, where the data is split between
public and trusted parties. Secondly, we provide an actual
implementation of this framework in practice for the case of
images using Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs).
Concretely, consider a three-party image/visual informa-
tion sharing or usage scenario that involves (a) a data owner,
(b) data users, and (c) service provider(s). The data owner
outsources some representations of the images that s/he owns
to the ‘honest but curious’ server(s) for storage or further
communication or sharing with data users. S/he attempts to:
(1) protect the original data collection from server side anal-
yses interested in knowing the data content provided by the
data owner; (2) provide a pre-determined utility (e.g. recon-
struction) for his/her authorized clients; (3) protect original
data collection against the un-authorized parties. In order to
follow Kerckhoffs’s Principle in cryptography, we further as-
sume that the data-sharing mechanism is publicly known, but
a secret key used for the data protection is kept secret.
To avoid expensive solutions to provide security for
privacy-sensitive data, e.g., through cryptographic encryp-
tion, we propose to ambiguate the data representation (as
detailed next), and instead provide security only for the dis-
ambiguation key. This scheme, of course, is only useful when
the key is much smaller in size than the original data1 (before
and after ambiguation), for which we provide a practical so-
lution. A key justification for this double-splitting of the data
1So e.g., a naı¨ve permutation of image pixels is not useful, since the per-
mutation map is even larger than the original image.
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is the fact that compactness, while always desired at large-
scale setups, is much more of a cruicial need for security and
privacy solutions, both storage and communication.
While there is an extensive literature on using traditional
image compression codecs to provide security along with
compression, (e.g., see [12–15]), an important limitation
arises with these approaches when they are used in large-
scales and possibly for domain-specific images. Since in such
scenarios images have similar encoding (e.g., high concentra-
tion of activation of DCT coefficients at certain regions), the
adversary can benefit from this to infer the statistics of en-
coded images.2 Moreover, even the compression capability of
standard codecs have been seriously challenged by learning-
based solutions. This has led to an active area of research that
uses deep learning (see e.g., [16, 17]) to learn optimal com-
pression. This work follows the learning-based approach,
however, instead of the usual binary representations used
in these methods, we focus on sparsity of representations
similarly to [18]. This allows us to benefit from the SCA
framework [11, 19] for ambiguation.
This paper presents two main contributions: Firstly, we
introduce a data sharing setup as detailed in section 3, where
the cost of security is minimized in terms of the amount of
bits required, thanks to our end-to-end solution for capturing
data redundancies with representation learning. Secondly, we
provide a practical and scalable solution with two particular
architectural novelties for CNNs: 1) Multiple code-maps us-
ing fully-connected groups on convolutional filters. 2) The
k-sparsity non-linearity in CNNs along with ReLUs without
slowing down training. This is detailed in section 3. The ex-
perimental setup and concluding remarks are then presented
in sections 4 and 5, respectively.
2. PRIVACY-PRESERVING IMAGE SHARING
We encode the data x ∈ X , as the pair (up,us), where up ∈
Up is the part of the data stored in public, while us ∈ Us
is secured and is kept private. We require that, firstly, the
representation size of us in bits be much smaller than that
of up. Secondly, the guessing cost of the data only given
the public portion, i.e., x|us should be exponential, while its
reconstruction provided both parts, i.e., x|us,up should be
linear.
2.1. Proposed Scheme Overview
We achieve the above constraints with the following steps:
1) Neural network training: A network is first trained on
a sub-collection of the data, such that it produces compact
sparse codes. This is shared with the public domain.
2) Data owner encoding and ambiguating: The data
owner uses the trained network to sparsely encode all images
s/he possesses. The support of these codes are then kept
secure (e.g., through encryption or secure communication),
2However, if the image compression bases and quantizers are learned,
the network tries to spread-out the activities of the representations, as this
provides better rate-distortion trade-offs for the learned network.
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Fig. 1: The grouped linear block to produce sparse code-
maps: In the encoder side, convolutional feature maps are
independently fed to fully-connected linear layers and spar-
sified. Symmetrically, the decoder uses tied connections and
reconstruct the convolutional feature maps. This block is put
in the middle of the network.
and shared with their corresponding authorized parties. The
collection of all sparse codes are then ambiguated, as will be
detailed below, and then shared with the public domain.
3) Data users/parties disambiguating their content: The
individuals or trusted parties are provided with the indices of
the images that they have access to, as well as the secured
supports. This acts as the key to unlock their access-granted
content from the public ambiguated database.
2.2. Ambiguated Sparse Code Generation
Training Phase. Given the data samples x ∈ Rn, we
train a bottlenecked auto-encoder structure consisting of L
independent encoders, Enc[1](·), · · · ,Enc[L](·), where in-
put data variable x is encoded to L new representations as
z[l] = Enc[l](x),∀l ∈ [L] with z[l] ∈ Rm, and is (approx-
imately) reconstructed as xˆ[l] = Dec[l][z[l]], ∀l ∈ [L]. Fur-
thermore, the encoding is performed such that the codes are
k-sparse, i.e., card
(
supp
(
z[l]
))
= k, ∀ l, where supp (z[l])
is index set of nonzero entries of z[l] and card (·) denotes
cardinality of the set. The sparsity level k controls the recon-
struction fidelity of our auto-encoding mechanism.
Sharing Phase. The generated sparse representations are
then ambiguated and shared to the public service provider.
Given the sparse representation z[l] with sparsity level k, the
ambiguation mechanism A (·) adds kn ≥ 0 random noise
components to the orthogonal complement of z[l], with the
same statistics as sparse code to guarantee the indistinguish-
ably in the statistical properties. Therefore, we have:
u[l]p = A
(
z[l]
)
= z[l] ⊕ nsupp, (1)
where nsupp is random ambiguation noise added to the sup-
port complement of z[l] and ⊕ denotes the direct sum. Note
that ‖u[l]p ‖0 = k + kn = k′. The ambiguated sparse repre-
sentations u[l]p ,∀ l are then shared to the public domain. The
support of the latent representation z[l], denoted by u[l]s =
supp
(
z[l]
)
, is considered as the secure part of our data, which
is shared with the private data users.
Reconstruction Phase. Given the support information
u
[l]
s ,∀l ∈ [L], the service provider can reconstruct the data
as: xˆ[l] = Dec[l](z[l] | u[l]s ). Our encoding introduces a
concept of shared secrecy based on support intersection of
latent representations. We consider two hypotheses for sup-
port secrecy. H1: The authorized support secrecy us, H0:
The un-authorized support, generated and claimed by an
adversary.
As a result of this encoding, the number of bits required
to store an item of the secure part is:
H(us) = log2
(
m
k
)L
' mL×H2
( k
m
)
, (2)
where H2(α) = −α log2 α − (1 − α) log2 (1− α) is the bi-
nary entropy, and the approximation follows the Stirling’s.
From the other hand, up is ambiguated and is k′-sparse, with
k′ > k and for a typical 32-bit quantization of the non-zero
values, requires approximately H(up) ' 32mL × H2
(
k′
m
)
bits of storage per item. The adversary should then make(
k′
k
)L
guesses to reconstruct each item, i.e., O( expH(us)).
3. AUTOENCODER ARCHITECTURE
We need a practical autoencoder architecture that has three
properties: Firstly, it should be bottlenecked to provide com-
pact codes. This excludes some of the famous neural regres-
sors like the U-net [20], since they are not bottlenecked be-
cause of their skip-connections directly from the input to the
output. Secondly, we need sparsified codes. The usage of
sparsity-inducing non-linearities, however, is rare in the deep
learning literature. The few examples available correspond to
the line of work of “unrolling iterative algorithms as neural
networks”, e.g., as in LISTA [21,22], where sparsifying oper-
ators like the soft- or hard-thresholding functions are used as
non-linearities within neural networks. This, however, is not
common within the representation learning community.
Thirdly, we should be able to reconstruct images with
arbitrarily chosen levels of fidelity, corresponding to a pre-
scribed representation budget for us (and also a practical
upper-bound for representation of up).
To satisfy these requirements, we propose the “sparsify-
ing linear layers on groups”, as is schemed in Fig. 1. Note
that, while the fully-connected linear layers in the literature
are used in CNNs, mostly to bridge the convolutional features
with the one-hot encoding of softmax for classification, we
use them to diversify the activities of codes, since convolu-
tional features are highly correlated and most activities are
concentrated on small sub-sets of the feature space.
Note that it is not practical to simply reshape all convo-
lutional filters and feed them directly to a linear layer, since
this would require an extremely large matrix with intractable
complexity and a very high risk of over-fitting. Therefore,
we take each convolutional feature separately and pass it to
a much smaller fully-connected linear layer, as if we have a
large matrix with block-diagonal sparsity. As a byproduct, we
notice that the network learns multiple codes, each describing
different attributes of the image.
As far as the sparsifying operator is concerned, we craft
a custom non-linearity (introduced in [18]) that only passes
the k elements with largest magnitude, and zeros out other
coefficients. Note that this, in fact, is an adaptive version of
the hard-thresholding function, where the threshold is adapted
to each input sample to choose only k elements out of m.
4. EXPERIMENTS
We conduct experiments on the large-scale CelebA [23]
database of around 200, 000 images of size 128 × 128. We
randomly split the dataset and picked 80% of the images
only for training the network, and the rest only for testing.
We used the PyTorch [24] framework to implement and train
the above-explained architecture with 6 down-sampling con-
volutional blocks of ratios [1, 2, 1, 2, 1, 2], and a symmetric
decoder. We trained the network for around 40 epochs using
the standard Adam optimizer [25] and settings.
The network was designed to have L = 20 code-maps,
each with length m = 512, and the sparsity of k = 128 per
item and per code. The storage requirement to describe the
support of each item is then 20H2(
128
512 )
8×1024 ' 1.01KBytes, which
is very practical for secure communication purposes.
After the training, images from the test set are first en-
coded and, in order to assess their quality, are then decoded
with two sparsity values of k = 64, 128. These codes are then
ambiguated with random noise to amount for a total sparsity
value of k′ = 256 (i.e., 128 fake components). In order to
minimize the chances of the adversary for random guessing,
we generate the ambiguation noise from the same distribution
of the true non-zero informative components, i.e., the comple-
mentary truncated Gaussian distribution with adjusted thresh-
old and variance. Note that even after ambiguation, the public
database has a reasonably low storage cost, since the non-zero
values can be further quantized without loss of quality. Since
the adversary may have the knowledge that the true sparsity
was k = 128, we then try to attack the system by picking k
out of k′ non-zero values. However, since the distribution of
the non-zero activities is highly uniform (due to the network
trying to maximize its rate-distortion performance), and the
values were also added with the same distribution, this guess
can only be random with uniform distribution.
Following the shared secrecy based on support intersec-
tion of data which is introduced by SCA privacy mechanism,
the authorized data users can purify (unlock) the correspond-
ing ambiguated representation. However, the un-authorized
parties have no knowledge to ‘unlock’ the public stored rep-
resentations. Fig. 3 compares the outcomes of different
experiments visually and on 8 randomly-chosen images from
the test set. We can clearly confirm the high fidelity of the
encoded images for the authorized parties, as well as the non-
distinguishable quality of reconstruction for the adversary.
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Fig. 2: (a) Convolutional down-sampling block. (b) Convolutional up-sampling block with bilinear interpolation. (c) Structure
of the encoder of the network, where Bi blocks are according to (a), and B′i blocks use addition instead of concatenation for
skip-connections. The Grouped Linear block is sketched in Fig. 1. Note that the decoder network is symmetrical to the encoder.
Fig. 3: Visual performance on images from the test database. First row: original images — second row: reconstructed (k = 64)
— third row: reconstructed (k = 128) — forth row: reconstructed from ambiguated codes (k′ = 256)— fifth row: reconstructed
from random guessing of true codes (choosing k = 128 out of k′ = 256).
As was expected, the random guessing does not improve the
quality, since the chance of zeroing the noise is the same as
that of the original content.
As a quantitative comparison and in order to measure the
fidelity of the setup for both authorized and public domains,
we calculate PSNR (Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio) and SSIM
(Structural Similarity Index) of different experiments in com-
parison with the original image, as summarized in Table 1. As
can be seen, the rate-distortion performance of the network is
Recon. (k = 64)
rate = 0.0845
Recon. (k = 128)
rate = 0.1690
JPEG
rate = 0.1830
ambiguated
(k′ = 256)
rand. guess
(k′ = 256)
PSNR 28.66 30.75 22.40 12.00 12.31
SSIM 0.92 0.95 0.76 0.24 0.25
Table 1: Rate vs. image quality measures (Results averaged
over 200 randomly-selected images from the test set.)
very high, even without lossless entropy coding, and is notice-
ably surpassing JPEG. This has two reasons, firstly, because
of adapting to the content and hence better capturing redun-
dancies than fixed codecs, secondly, the fact that we only en-
code the support and not the non-zero values. However, these
values are not highly entropic and can be quantized, hence
surpassing JPEG even by providing privacy utility.
5. CONCLUSIONS
We introduced a practical data sharing scheme for privacy-
aware image sharing suitable for large-scale setups, where
compactness of representations is of important concern for
secure communication and storage. This was achieved by
ambiguating code-maps of sparse representations, for which
we designed a deep CNN as a bottlenecked autoencoder and
learned it end-to-end on a large-scale image database.
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